We're well over a year from the 2014 referendum on Scotland's independence (in fact it was
announced today that the date will be 18 September), but already debate is raging, and I am fascinated. As an American, I have no horse in this race, and I can't really say which outcome I'd like to see (not that it would matter much to anyone if I did). If I'm being honest, I'd have to say I like the romanticized notion of an independent Scotland. However, the issues, when you begin to investigate them, are complex, and thus the decision Scotland must now make is not so clear-cut. I intend to write more about it, but I'm starting with just one portion of the debate, because of concerns about the length of my posts. I'm hoping, by the way, to be corrected on anything I've said here that may be wrong, misguided, or just plain stupid. If you have a concern, let me have it!
One key piece of the debate is how the new nation can fare economically. And no small part of determining that question is to determine what future revenues from North Sea oil will be. To that end projections have been made. Now, this becomes a problem very quickly. On the one hand because predicting the economic future is fraught with all kinds of problems, but more importantly for the present purpose: two radically different projections have emerged.
One projection, endorsed and used by the No Campaign, is perhaps unfairly pessimistic, which, of course, supports their political cause. And
one projection, endorsed and used by the Yes Campaign, is perhaps unfairly optimistic, which, of course supports their political cause.
This issue is obviously of vital importance to Scotland, because how well the new country would be able to support itself is paramount in deciding whether to choose independence and manage this revenue alone, or to remain part of the UK if there isn't going to be enough to run the government. Clearly it is important, but not, I don't think, particularly helpful.
The reason I don't think it is helpful is, for one thing, the difference between the numbers means that it's very likely that one or both of them is flawed. Another reason, which to be honest is more suspicion than anything, is that these figures won't change anyone's mind anyway.
With respect to this first point, that it's very likely that one or both of these numbers is flawed, well, it might be interesting in a gossip column kind of way to follow the money trail behind these two figures and the organizations that produced them and find evidence of profound bias or even corruption. That may well happen anyway. Even if it does happen, it doesn't help anything. It doesn't answer the real questions about what the real state of affairs with North Sea oil will be, or what the Scottish voters should decide on referendum day. The most that it should bring about is to make figures within the debate look untrustworthy. That is not the same thing at all as deciding the issue (though obviously it could have an effect when votes are cast. That is the unfortunate difference between what is and what ought to be).
Regarding that second point, that these figures won't persuade anyone: this is a fear I'm carrying with me as part of my American baggage: people will only pay attention to the facts that it is convenient to pay attention to, and when compelled to pay attention to inconvenient facts, they rework them to fit their existing narrative. The result of this is a breakdown of discourse. We can't have a meaningful discussion about something, if we can't agree on what the something we're discussing is to begin with. We have to at least be talking in the same reality.
If that explanation of why I don't think it will be persuasive is itself too speculative to be persuasive, here's an alternative reason for thinking so, at least for now: we don't yet know in detail what the nature of the new government will be and how much will be "enough" to run it, what sources the revenue could come from, etc. in order to know which point the number must be above in order for a Yes vote to not be irresponsible. That is the key: having defined Yes/No parameters, that is whenever it is appropriate to discuss the future of oil prices.
It avoids the more fundamental question, though, which is this: if all of the concerns were addressed to everyone's satisfaction, then should Scotland become an independent state? In other words, does the outcome of oil revenue determine the entire thing? It's a much more difficult question. It is THE question. But I think framing it in these terms gives undecideds a groundwork for making a decision.
