Thursday, April 22, 2010

Tenets of the Blah Blah Blah Party

1. Our Platform: political platforms are quite useless.
People use positions on "salient issues" to determine who they will vote for. These positions rarely make any difference at all in terms of how things actually turn out.

2. Party loyalty is absurd.

3. Patriotism is the plural form of patting yourself on the back.

4. Voting is really a waste of your time. The choice between showboat A and showboat B is non-substantive.

5. Every tenet of every political party, including this one, is false.

6. Our Agenda: We have no agenda.
Agendas do nothing but generate criticism. You either did enough, or you didn't do enough. You're either too ambitious or not ambitious enough. Whatever you do, it won't be what you planned, the way you planned it. As long as you had a plan, you failed to achieve it.

Monday, March 29, 2010

The nasty influence of Rock Music

My, do things such as this ever crack me up.

Okay, so a group planned to kill a cop and then blow up all his cop buddies at the funeral. That's not funny. Claiming a religious basis for waging war on America, is also not funny.

What does is the description of the militant group's training video which included the line, "It is edited to a backing track of rock music."

Sunday, March 28, 2010

Lincoln Waged War on Half the Country?

I've been trying to understand this whole tea party movement thing. I don't think I'll ever be successful in that project.
Short version of the story: I found this website, which led me to a story (linked below) with this quote:

"The president who had the least fidelity to the Constitution was Abraham Lincoln, who waged war on half the country, even though there's obviously no authority for that, a war that killed nearly 700,000 people. President Obama is close to that end of lacking fidelity to the Constitution."
-author and judicial analyst Andrew P. Napolitano

Lincoln the war-wager, eh? Not the man who said "A house divided against itself cannot stand."

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

A Consequentialist's Thoughts on John Travolta's trip to Haiti

To quote Kurt Vonnegut's Uncle Alex, "Well, if this isn't nice, I don't know what is."

What's nice? This.

John Travolta uses his personal jet to fly supplies to the people of Haiti (I hope it isn't lost on you that I say "the people of Haiti" rather than "Haiti"). This is an action of positive moral value. Why? Because it will help people who need to be helped.

I am going to belabor this point, so bear with me.

It's moral value is not affected by being in accord or not being in accord with the man's principles, or the principles of Scientology. It may or not be, I don't even know. Would being in accord with said principles be the cause of the good done by the action?

It's moral value is not affected by being in accord or not being in accord with the principles of "Christian morality" (whatever they are supposed to be!). Again, would being in accord with these principles be the cause of the good done by the action?

It's moral value is not affected by the presence of the press. Even if he did this for the sake of publicity, it doesn't affect the moral appraisal. That is to say, his intent is not relevant. Would performing this action out of a desire to become famous preclude the good that is done by the action from being good?

What I want to say is the basis for evaluating Mr. Travolta's actions (and not just his, ours as well, and those of anyone else) ought to be the consequences of the action. There are problems with this standard, to be sure, just as there are problems with any other ethical or moral standard (if anyone wants to raise some of them, I'll happily try and defend myself).

Mr. Travolta's claim in this clip echos a standard of Peter Singer's ethics: If we can help someone in need, at relatively little cost to ourselves, then we ought to do so. In his book, The Life You Can Save Singer goes to great lengths to spell out exactly what "relatively little cost" means for acting to end world poverty. I think we can summarize it somewhat imprecisely by "whatever you can stand to lose anyway without altering your standard of living." That doesn't, of course, mean that there won't be sacrifices. A pet example of Singer's is drinking tap water rather than bottled water. Another is wearing canvas shoes rather than shoes that are a) more expensive and/or b) made from animal skins. We can lose these luxuries without changing our standard of living, however.

Further, the cost is "relatively little" compared to the harm that may result from failure to act in accordance with this principle. Not flying supplies to the people of Haiti, say, may be tantamount to allowing someone to die. We needn't pad the numbers, although surely more than one life can be saved by Travolta's action: just one life saved is sufficient to outweigh the cost of flying the supplies there yourself, in your own jet, especially if you have the time and resources to do so.

Now, we don't all have private jets, or millions of dollars. And if we all did, and we all flew supplies down there, we'd probably not be able to land our planes. My point in holding up this example as an example of an action with positive moral value is not to say that we should do what John Travolta did. But to say that we should act according to the principle that explains why his action is good.

Well done, Mr. Travolta, and thanks for the good news.

Thursday, November 26, 2009

Anti-Intellectualism in the American Right

It so happens that our political landscape has so changed as to include certain conservative views that make illegitimate the striving of college students, and to paint a picture of the University as if it were a "Liberal Factory." On that ground, it is claimed, people should be wary of universities, and especially of their faculty: they might turn you into a Marxist, if you aren't careful.

Ordinarily, I would argue that anyone who makes such a claim is immediately out of the conversation. This view is clearly self-defeating. However, the view is becoming more and more pervasive as time goes by. It goes far beyond asking "Why philosophy?" so far, in fact, as to claim that by subjecting yourself to the liberal ideology of collegiate institutions, you make yourself into a liberal.

I submit to you that his is a classic example of a claim that "proves too much." If a conservatively-minded young collegian goes to college, and comes out four years later a "liberal" only by being exposed to "liberal" ideology, "conservativism" must be a very weak position indeed!

Moreover, I find it to be oddly self-serving for people who have not gone to college to argue that the intellectuals and academics are the idiots. If that were the case, the less you accomplish, the greater reason you have for patting yourself on the back.

One suggestion for where this came from is the age-old Faith vs. Reason debate, if "conservativism" is properly identified with christian theology. (I do not think it should be. I think, instead, that Jesus of Nazareth would rather be called "socialist" by today's conservative christians, see Luke 18:18-25). However, upon closer inspection, we find no traces at all of such a debate. If the objection was that the university is a purveyor of the Theory of Evolution, this debate fits. However, this is not the objection, or at least it doesn't seem to be. The objection is rather that the university system has an ideological bias in favor of the politically left. These are (in reality) distinct issues. Although, perhaps an objection formed in the widest possible way could include them both: that is, an objection against critical thinking, or questioning our beliefs. In such a case, the objector might claim that any such questioning is impious.

Then the weaker position, the conservative position, has a survivalist reason for not thinking colleges are good things: the position won't hold up to criticism. Can this really be what they are saying?

How do you reason with such a person? You can't. To reason with them is to beg the question.

Saturday, November 21, 2009

A Defense of Philosophy Part 2

Part Two: The Intrinsic Value Approach

1. Some activities are intrinsically valuable
Musicians, many of them anyway, do not practice their craft because it will earn them money, or because it will sharpen their mental abilities, or even to express themselves. They play music because it is a good thing to do. They enjoy it “in itself.” An account of the neurological benefits of playing music—say, if it were found that playing music releases endorphins and causes a feeling of elation—would not explain why these musicians make music (although it may influence many to take it up). They play music because they love music and for no other reason. For this kind of musician, music is intrinsically valuable.
The benefits of the activity are not part of the explanation of why a person participates in an intrinsically valuable activity even if there are such benefits.

2. Philosophers love Philosophy
If you consider the etymology of the word “philosophy” (from “philos” and “sophos”), the word literally means “love of wisdom”. Philosophy is itself a form of love. We philosophers, like musicians, love what we do.
When a concerned parent or relative asks a young philosophy student “Why would you do that?” They are usually worried about the student’s ability to make money in the future. They are, in a way, right to worry about this. Philosophy is not an efficient way to make money. The job market for professorships in philosophy is very competitive, and the pay for such positions is often lackluster.
So why do we go into the field? We do it because we love it and for no other reason.

3. Participating in Philosophy is Intrinsically valuable
Philosophers and non-philosophers alike can find philosophical inquiry to be valuable in itself. Thinking philosophically or pondering philosophical questions is intellectually rewarding and can be quite enjoyable and enriching.
It is this enriching quality of philosophy that makes it so valuable. It is its own reward.

4. Conclusions from the Intrinsic Value Approach
We have seen that the extrinsic value of philosophy is not the reason why we go into philosophy, and may not be the reason for non-philosophers to also participate in our field as well. When Popper said “this is the only apology for the continued existence of philosophy which I am able to offer,” he means it in terms of the extrinsic value of philosophy. This is misleading, as it suggests that this is the only value in philosophy. The reason why it exists is not explained by his argument.
The reason for its continued existence is that people continue to engage in it. For these people the value in engaging in it is intrinsic, even if what we actually do is extrinsically valuable.
What can be said against this approach? You might not accept the premise that philosophy is intrinsically valuable. You could deny that there is any enrichment in participating in philosophical activity. What seems likely is that this response can only come from a non-philosopher. Someone who has either not participated in philosophy, or who has, but didn’t understand the issues well enough to get anything out of the experience might make such a claim.

Part 3: General Comments on the Two Approaches
What is important to note about the relationship between the intrinsic and extrinsic approach to answering the question “Why Philosophy?” is that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. In the preceding section this was made explicit: What we do is extrinsically valuable, and the reason we do it is its intrinsic value.
These two approaches correspond to two different senses the question can be taken to mean. If the question is taken to mean “Why do we need philosophy?” the extrinsic approach is an appropriate response. If the question is taken to mean “Why would you study philosophy?” the intrinsic approach is an appropriate response.
Furthermore, these approaches, especially the extrinsic approach, are not completely characterized by my descriptions of them. My descriptions are intended to exemplify the general approaches, not to encapsulate them.