It so happens that our political landscape has so changed as to include certain conservative views that make illegitimate the striving of college students, and to paint a picture of the University as if it were a "Liberal Factory." On that ground, it is claimed, people should be wary of universities, and especially of their faculty: they might turn you into a Marxist, if you aren't careful.
Ordinarily, I would argue that anyone who makes such a claim is immediately out of the conversation. This view is clearly self-defeating. However, the view is becoming more and more pervasive as time goes by. It goes far beyond asking "Why philosophy?" so far, in fact, as to claim that by subjecting yourself to the liberal ideology of collegiate institutions, you make yourself into a liberal.
I submit to you that his is a classic example of a claim that "proves too much." If a conservatively-minded young collegian goes to college, and comes out four years later a "liberal" only by being exposed to "liberal" ideology, "conservativism" must be a very weak position indeed!
Moreover, I find it to be oddly self-serving for people who have not gone to college to argue that the intellectuals and academics are the idiots. If that were the case, the less you accomplish, the greater reason you have for patting yourself on the back.
One suggestion for where this came from is the age-old Faith vs. Reason debate, if "conservativism" is properly identified with christian theology. (I do not think it should be. I think, instead, that Jesus of Nazareth would rather be called "socialist" by today's conservative christians, see Luke 18:18-25). However, upon closer inspection, we find no traces at all of such a debate. If the objection was that the university is a purveyor of the Theory of Evolution, this debate fits. However, this is not the objection, or at least it doesn't seem to be. The objection is rather that the university system has an ideological bias in favor of the politically left. These are (in reality) distinct issues. Although, perhaps an objection formed in the widest possible way could include them both: that is, an objection against critical thinking, or questioning our beliefs. In such a case, the objector might claim that any such questioning is impious.
Then the weaker position, the conservative position, has a survivalist reason for not thinking colleges are good things: the position won't hold up to criticism. Can this really be what they are saying?
How do you reason with such a person? You can't. To reason with them is to beg the question.
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Saturday, November 21, 2009
A Defense of Philosophy Part 2
Part Two: The Intrinsic Value Approach
1. Some activities are intrinsically valuable
Musicians, many of them anyway, do not practice their craft because it will earn them money, or because it will sharpen their mental abilities, or even to express themselves. They play music because it is a good thing to do. They enjoy it “in itself.” An account of the neurological benefits of playing music—say, if it were found that playing music releases endorphins and causes a feeling of elation—would not explain why these musicians make music (although it may influence many to take it up). They play music because they love music and for no other reason. For this kind of musician, music is intrinsically valuable.
The benefits of the activity are not part of the explanation of why a person participates in an intrinsically valuable activity even if there are such benefits.
2. Philosophers love Philosophy
If you consider the etymology of the word “philosophy” (from “philos” and “sophos”), the word literally means “love of wisdom”. Philosophy is itself a form of love. We philosophers, like musicians, love what we do.
When a concerned parent or relative asks a young philosophy student “Why would you do that?” They are usually worried about the student’s ability to make money in the future. They are, in a way, right to worry about this. Philosophy is not an efficient way to make money. The job market for professorships in philosophy is very competitive, and the pay for such positions is often lackluster.
So why do we go into the field? We do it because we love it and for no other reason.
3. Participating in Philosophy is Intrinsically valuable
Philosophers and non-philosophers alike can find philosophical inquiry to be valuable in itself. Thinking philosophically or pondering philosophical questions is intellectually rewarding and can be quite enjoyable and enriching.
It is this enriching quality of philosophy that makes it so valuable. It is its own reward.
4. Conclusions from the Intrinsic Value Approach
We have seen that the extrinsic value of philosophy is not the reason why we go into philosophy, and may not be the reason for non-philosophers to also participate in our field as well. When Popper said “this is the only apology for the continued existence of philosophy which I am able to offer,” he means it in terms of the extrinsic value of philosophy. This is misleading, as it suggests that this is the only value in philosophy. The reason why it exists is not explained by his argument.
The reason for its continued existence is that people continue to engage in it. For these people the value in engaging in it is intrinsic, even if what we actually do is extrinsically valuable.
What can be said against this approach? You might not accept the premise that philosophy is intrinsically valuable. You could deny that there is any enrichment in participating in philosophical activity. What seems likely is that this response can only come from a non-philosopher. Someone who has either not participated in philosophy, or who has, but didn’t understand the issues well enough to get anything out of the experience might make such a claim.
Part 3: General Comments on the Two Approaches
What is important to note about the relationship between the intrinsic and extrinsic approach to answering the question “Why Philosophy?” is that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. In the preceding section this was made explicit: What we do is extrinsically valuable, and the reason we do it is its intrinsic value.
These two approaches correspond to two different senses the question can be taken to mean. If the question is taken to mean “Why do we need philosophy?” the extrinsic approach is an appropriate response. If the question is taken to mean “Why would you study philosophy?” the intrinsic approach is an appropriate response.
Furthermore, these approaches, especially the extrinsic approach, are not completely characterized by my descriptions of them. My descriptions are intended to exemplify the general approaches, not to encapsulate them.
1. Some activities are intrinsically valuable
Musicians, many of them anyway, do not practice their craft because it will earn them money, or because it will sharpen their mental abilities, or even to express themselves. They play music because it is a good thing to do. They enjoy it “in itself.” An account of the neurological benefits of playing music—say, if it were found that playing music releases endorphins and causes a feeling of elation—would not explain why these musicians make music (although it may influence many to take it up). They play music because they love music and for no other reason. For this kind of musician, music is intrinsically valuable.
The benefits of the activity are not part of the explanation of why a person participates in an intrinsically valuable activity even if there are such benefits.
2. Philosophers love Philosophy
If you consider the etymology of the word “philosophy” (from “philos” and “sophos”), the word literally means “love of wisdom”. Philosophy is itself a form of love. We philosophers, like musicians, love what we do.
When a concerned parent or relative asks a young philosophy student “Why would you do that?” They are usually worried about the student’s ability to make money in the future. They are, in a way, right to worry about this. Philosophy is not an efficient way to make money. The job market for professorships in philosophy is very competitive, and the pay for such positions is often lackluster.
So why do we go into the field? We do it because we love it and for no other reason.
3. Participating in Philosophy is Intrinsically valuable
Philosophers and non-philosophers alike can find philosophical inquiry to be valuable in itself. Thinking philosophically or pondering philosophical questions is intellectually rewarding and can be quite enjoyable and enriching.
It is this enriching quality of philosophy that makes it so valuable. It is its own reward.
4. Conclusions from the Intrinsic Value Approach
We have seen that the extrinsic value of philosophy is not the reason why we go into philosophy, and may not be the reason for non-philosophers to also participate in our field as well. When Popper said “this is the only apology for the continued existence of philosophy which I am able to offer,” he means it in terms of the extrinsic value of philosophy. This is misleading, as it suggests that this is the only value in philosophy. The reason why it exists is not explained by his argument.
The reason for its continued existence is that people continue to engage in it. For these people the value in engaging in it is intrinsic, even if what we actually do is extrinsically valuable.
What can be said against this approach? You might not accept the premise that philosophy is intrinsically valuable. You could deny that there is any enrichment in participating in philosophical activity. What seems likely is that this response can only come from a non-philosopher. Someone who has either not participated in philosophy, or who has, but didn’t understand the issues well enough to get anything out of the experience might make such a claim.
Part 3: General Comments on the Two Approaches
What is important to note about the relationship between the intrinsic and extrinsic approach to answering the question “Why Philosophy?” is that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. In the preceding section this was made explicit: What we do is extrinsically valuable, and the reason we do it is its intrinsic value.
These two approaches correspond to two different senses the question can be taken to mean. If the question is taken to mean “Why do we need philosophy?” the extrinsic approach is an appropriate response. If the question is taken to mean “Why would you study philosophy?” the intrinsic approach is an appropriate response.
Furthermore, these approaches, especially the extrinsic approach, are not completely characterized by my descriptions of them. My descriptions are intended to exemplify the general approaches, not to encapsulate them.
A Defense of Philosophy Part 1
We philosophers are rarely, if ever, in consensus about anything. I am sure we can all agree on one thing: We are all tired of defending our decision (if it really was a decision) to study philosophy. There are many varied answers to the question “Why philosophy?” Some of us turn to the age and respectability of the philosophical tradition. Some of us discuss the role that philosophy played in “birthing” the special sciences.
I think these answers miss the point of the question. A responsible inquirer might respond, “Certainly philosophy has had a wonderful and fecund past, but why philosophy now, and what can it do in the future?” In other words, why does philosophy continue to exist, and why study it these days?
Some of us do try to answer these questions. This paper is an exploration of two general approaches to answering them.
Part One: The Extrinsic Value Response
The first approach we will examine attempts to justify philosophy in terms of its value to the world now. Here is an example of one such response:
“We all have our philosophies, whether or not we are aware of this fact, and our philosophies are not worth very much. But the impact of our philosophies on our actions and our lives is often devastating. This makes it necessary to try to improve our philosophies by criticism. This is the only apology for the continued existence of philosophy which I am able to offer.”
Karl Popper. Objective Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 1972. P. 33.
While I think Popper gets to the heart of why philosophy needs to continue, I think we can improve on his “apology for philosophy” somewhat.
1. People base their actions on their beliefs
I’ve changed the terminology a little bit. “Philosophies” in Popper’s usage can easily be replaced by “worldviews”, “concepts”, “ideologies”, or “beliefs”. We all have beliefs (both in the sense of propositions we accept as true, and in the sense of belief-systems). These are decision-making principles that abbreviate the process of gathering information and insight into a state of affairs. They also give meaning and evaluation to things in the world.
A person’s religious, political, or scientific views put events into a context or background that enables action.
2. Most people hold their beliefs unreflectively
People typically do not think much about the background beliefs they hold that form the bases of their action. Some people are “brought up” in a religious or political tradition, and take the beliefs of such a tradition as granted. Many beliefs are simply picked up “second-hand” by word of mouth, which includes media sources that may or may not be well-reputed.
There have also been a number of psychological studies that suggest that a) people are less rational about their beliefs than they think they are and b) people are susceptible to fooling themselves into thinking that they are better at decision-making than what they really are. This susceptibility is called a “confirmation bias”: people who have in fact made an incorrect decision may introspect about their reasons for having made the decision, and convince themselves that they are not in error.
3. The truth, justificatory status, & consistency of unreflective beliefs are indeterminate
By definition unreflective beliefs are not considered properly. The question of their accuracy is never asked. People do not think about why they believe what they in fact believe, or whether or not they ought to. Any such belief runs the risk of being contradictory with other beliefs held by the same person.
This is not to say that unreflective beliefs are all bad. Many of them are true, held with decent justification, and perfectly consistent with other beliefs. But, without thinking about the beliefs carefully, there is no way for the individual to tell which the “good” beliefs are and which the “bad” ones are.
4. Action performed on the basis of unreflective beliefs is dangerous
Now, because actions are based on beliefs, and because beliefs people hold may be untrue or unjustified, actions can be harmful to others. In the paragraphs above the one quoted, Popper discusses the case of National Socialism. This shows the extreme harm that unreflective beliefs can bring about.
But we need not look to the Nazis for examples of unreflective beliefs that lead people to act in harmful ways. Any daily interaction is informed by beliefs about the sort of people we interact with, about the way to talk to people, about what the objectives of such interactions are, etc. Merely considering what these beliefs are, how accurate they are, and how well-supported they are can not only reduce the amount of harmful action, but can bring about interactions that are more positive, helpful, and productive.
5. Conclusions from the Extrinsic Value Approach
We have seen that basing our actions on our unreflective beliefs is risky business. It is the philosophical (or critical) method that we use to properly analyze and evaluate these beliefs. This is essentially Popper’s argument. We should take issue, however, with the idea that this critical method is only useful insofar as it can be used to reduce harmful action. We should add that this method encourages positive, or helpful action.
What can be said against this approach? One thing that stands out is that this argument seems to impoverish the study of philosophy down to merely correcting action. Perhaps this isn’t so impoverishing, though. Not all action is moral action, after all. There are all sorts of areas of activity that can be improved upon by reflecting on our beliefs using this critical method.
Even at that, many philosophers would not be inclined to go along with this “apology”. They would argue that, while philosophy may have extrinsic value, the reason for their interest in the field is its intrinsic value. They would argue that philosophy is good “in itself”. In Part Two we will examine arguments from this approach to defending philosophy.
I think these answers miss the point of the question. A responsible inquirer might respond, “Certainly philosophy has had a wonderful and fecund past, but why philosophy now, and what can it do in the future?” In other words, why does philosophy continue to exist, and why study it these days?
Some of us do try to answer these questions. This paper is an exploration of two general approaches to answering them.
Part One: The Extrinsic Value Response
The first approach we will examine attempts to justify philosophy in terms of its value to the world now. Here is an example of one such response:
“We all have our philosophies, whether or not we are aware of this fact, and our philosophies are not worth very much. But the impact of our philosophies on our actions and our lives is often devastating. This makes it necessary to try to improve our philosophies by criticism. This is the only apology for the continued existence of philosophy which I am able to offer.”
Karl Popper. Objective Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 1972. P. 33.
While I think Popper gets to the heart of why philosophy needs to continue, I think we can improve on his “apology for philosophy” somewhat.
1. People base their actions on their beliefs
I’ve changed the terminology a little bit. “Philosophies” in Popper’s usage can easily be replaced by “worldviews”, “concepts”, “ideologies”, or “beliefs”. We all have beliefs (both in the sense of propositions we accept as true, and in the sense of belief-systems). These are decision-making principles that abbreviate the process of gathering information and insight into a state of affairs. They also give meaning and evaluation to things in the world.
A person’s religious, political, or scientific views put events into a context or background that enables action.
2. Most people hold their beliefs unreflectively
People typically do not think much about the background beliefs they hold that form the bases of their action. Some people are “brought up” in a religious or political tradition, and take the beliefs of such a tradition as granted. Many beliefs are simply picked up “second-hand” by word of mouth, which includes media sources that may or may not be well-reputed.
There have also been a number of psychological studies that suggest that a) people are less rational about their beliefs than they think they are and b) people are susceptible to fooling themselves into thinking that they are better at decision-making than what they really are. This susceptibility is called a “confirmation bias”: people who have in fact made an incorrect decision may introspect about their reasons for having made the decision, and convince themselves that they are not in error.
3. The truth, justificatory status, & consistency of unreflective beliefs are indeterminate
By definition unreflective beliefs are not considered properly. The question of their accuracy is never asked. People do not think about why they believe what they in fact believe, or whether or not they ought to. Any such belief runs the risk of being contradictory with other beliefs held by the same person.
This is not to say that unreflective beliefs are all bad. Many of them are true, held with decent justification, and perfectly consistent with other beliefs. But, without thinking about the beliefs carefully, there is no way for the individual to tell which the “good” beliefs are and which the “bad” ones are.
4. Action performed on the basis of unreflective beliefs is dangerous
Now, because actions are based on beliefs, and because beliefs people hold may be untrue or unjustified, actions can be harmful to others. In the paragraphs above the one quoted, Popper discusses the case of National Socialism. This shows the extreme harm that unreflective beliefs can bring about.
But we need not look to the Nazis for examples of unreflective beliefs that lead people to act in harmful ways. Any daily interaction is informed by beliefs about the sort of people we interact with, about the way to talk to people, about what the objectives of such interactions are, etc. Merely considering what these beliefs are, how accurate they are, and how well-supported they are can not only reduce the amount of harmful action, but can bring about interactions that are more positive, helpful, and productive.
5. Conclusions from the Extrinsic Value Approach
We have seen that basing our actions on our unreflective beliefs is risky business. It is the philosophical (or critical) method that we use to properly analyze and evaluate these beliefs. This is essentially Popper’s argument. We should take issue, however, with the idea that this critical method is only useful insofar as it can be used to reduce harmful action. We should add that this method encourages positive, or helpful action.
What can be said against this approach? One thing that stands out is that this argument seems to impoverish the study of philosophy down to merely correcting action. Perhaps this isn’t so impoverishing, though. Not all action is moral action, after all. There are all sorts of areas of activity that can be improved upon by reflecting on our beliefs using this critical method.
Even at that, many philosophers would not be inclined to go along with this “apology”. They would argue that, while philosophy may have extrinsic value, the reason for their interest in the field is its intrinsic value. They would argue that philosophy is good “in itself”. In Part Two we will examine arguments from this approach to defending philosophy.
Monday, June 8, 2009
My Old Kentucky Home
I really can’t stand the Kentucky Derby. I don’t really like the festival either.
It all begins with that stupid fireworks show. “Oh, it’s bigger than last year.” It’s the same every year.
Besides, if you really enjoy fireworks, you’re either pre-pubescent, in need of a helmet, or in need of rehab. AND, if you’re one of those people who goes and tries to be ironic and say “ooh…Aaah” you’re not ironic. You’re an asshole.
I don’t like fireworks anyway, for personal reasons. I was born on the fourth of July, and at a certain age I realized that all the fireworks weren’t for me. That sort of thing leaves a young man jaded. But they’re boring anyway. They’re just explosions of different colors. How could it be that, in the information age, when you can get on the internet and watch videos of people pulling fly larvae out of their skin, could you leave that behind and go watch fireworks? To drink? You know you can stay home and drink, right? There’s no traffic at home, either. So it’s better.
I think it would be great if no one went to Thunder one year. Because the local news stations would still cover it all day. It’d be like Wayne’s World 2, “There are still plenty of great seats available…” Festival planners would be re-thinking their lives, “I can’t believe we thought fireworks would last forever.” It’d be awesome.
There are good parts of the festival, like all the free music. But Louisville kind of gets a big head during those two weeks. It’s like they think that just because all of these celebrities come in to see what it’s like, that makes the city important. It doesn’t.
If Louisville were so important they wouldn’t have to hang all of those banners everywhere reminding people on the interstate that occasionally the city coughs up a famous person. How pathetic is that? It’s not like knowing that Ali was from Louisville makes people want to come here.
Then, there’s the race itself, and it’s like a woman’s bad dating story. “Everything built up to it for two weeks and then it only lasted two minutes.” It’s just a horse race. There are only a handful of people out there that really care about horse racing. I don’t.
I hate being asked who I think will win the derby, “Probably the horse that runs the fastest time?” It’s not on my list of things to pay attention to. And most likely you don’t really care either. You probably didn’t start paying attention to horses until the month before the derby and you think it makes you an expert.
I call this the Michael Phelps Syndrome. Remember during the Olympics when suddenly everyone cared about swimming. People were saying things like “The 100-meter breaststroke is next. That’s his best race you know,” or whichever one it was, I don’t care. Like they trained the guy, or even heard about him more than two weeks before.
Do what I do. Ask these people for specific information like, who has he raced against, where, what are his best times, why do you think he’s better than others? Why? Because they don’t know. Once you establish that, then you can tell them to shut up and pay attention to more important things. Like how to extract fly larvae from your forearm. At least that information could someday come in handy.
It all begins with that stupid fireworks show. “Oh, it’s bigger than last year.” It’s the same every year.
Besides, if you really enjoy fireworks, you’re either pre-pubescent, in need of a helmet, or in need of rehab. AND, if you’re one of those people who goes and tries to be ironic and say “ooh…Aaah” you’re not ironic. You’re an asshole.
I don’t like fireworks anyway, for personal reasons. I was born on the fourth of July, and at a certain age I realized that all the fireworks weren’t for me. That sort of thing leaves a young man jaded. But they’re boring anyway. They’re just explosions of different colors. How could it be that, in the information age, when you can get on the internet and watch videos of people pulling fly larvae out of their skin, could you leave that behind and go watch fireworks? To drink? You know you can stay home and drink, right? There’s no traffic at home, either. So it’s better.
I think it would be great if no one went to Thunder one year. Because the local news stations would still cover it all day. It’d be like Wayne’s World 2, “There are still plenty of great seats available…” Festival planners would be re-thinking their lives, “I can’t believe we thought fireworks would last forever.” It’d be awesome.
There are good parts of the festival, like all the free music. But Louisville kind of gets a big head during those two weeks. It’s like they think that just because all of these celebrities come in to see what it’s like, that makes the city important. It doesn’t.
If Louisville were so important they wouldn’t have to hang all of those banners everywhere reminding people on the interstate that occasionally the city coughs up a famous person. How pathetic is that? It’s not like knowing that Ali was from Louisville makes people want to come here.
Then, there’s the race itself, and it’s like a woman’s bad dating story. “Everything built up to it for two weeks and then it only lasted two minutes.” It’s just a horse race. There are only a handful of people out there that really care about horse racing. I don’t.
I hate being asked who I think will win the derby, “Probably the horse that runs the fastest time?” It’s not on my list of things to pay attention to. And most likely you don’t really care either. You probably didn’t start paying attention to horses until the month before the derby and you think it makes you an expert.
I call this the Michael Phelps Syndrome. Remember during the Olympics when suddenly everyone cared about swimming. People were saying things like “The 100-meter breaststroke is next. That’s his best race you know,” or whichever one it was, I don’t care. Like they trained the guy, or even heard about him more than two weeks before.
Do what I do. Ask these people for specific information like, who has he raced against, where, what are his best times, why do you think he’s better than others? Why? Because they don’t know. Once you establish that, then you can tell them to shut up and pay attention to more important things. Like how to extract fly larvae from your forearm. At least that information could someday come in handy.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
In Flux
I laughed at it.
I discredited as "bad" English. I pointed it out to my family--predominately educators. There it was, on the packaging of a gift I had bought for my niece: "3 Wood Egg Shakers."
"Wood!" I said, "It's a noun! If you want an adjective you're going to have to go with 'wooden'!"
This observation broke the dam. A flood of grammatical pet peeves flowed forth. People use apostrophes to denote plurals instead of possession, double negatives, bad spelling, and "text" has become a verb!
We're losing our language, my family decided. I balked.
In a certain sense, this is correct. In another, more important sense, it's just plain wrong.
English teachers, or teachers of any language for that matter, may hate me for it, but I must point out that grammatical rules are not universal. They are not immutable. They are only normative to a very small extent: a much lesser extent than some people may want to give them credit for.
More about normativity later. For now, let's start with description.
Natural languages (commonly spoken ones) exist in flux. They change drastically over time and space. Yes, space. We speak the same English as the English?
And time is so much clearer. Languages evolve. Chaucer, Shakespeare, Thoreau, and I all wrote in English. Although you might properly say none of us writes in the same language.
And in that sense, my family is correct: we are losing our language. This version of English will pass away like all the others.
Over the past few decades, as the speed and ease of communication have increased, so has the rate of the language's evolution. And, as the language changes, so do it's rules. We shouldn't be surprised by this.
Now to the normative bit: maybe from what I've said, we have alienated the speakers of a language from it's rulebooks. As much as it may pain the high school Language Arts faculty, we should not insist on outmoded rules, and we should expect our current ones to change over time. Especially if they are exposed to be arbitrary, and not quite the criteria for distinguishing between "proper" and "improper" usage.
A few clarifications: first, it is not that the rules don't exist, or aren't rules. They are subjective to time and place, and so will change. Newer usages may irritate us, but if they become standard, that shouldn't bother us so much.
Second, the rules are not non-normative. They really do determine proper usage, but only within the spatio-temporal context of the speaker. And at that, the content is more important than the structure.
Third, and most important, the rules as they exist in usage, are noticed and then put into textbooks, not the other way around. That is, usage dictates rules (generally speaking).
So, I can proudly say now, that I am just going to go Google some wood fishes, and maybe text you about it later.
I discredited as "bad" English. I pointed it out to my family--predominately educators. There it was, on the packaging of a gift I had bought for my niece: "3 Wood Egg Shakers."
"Wood!" I said, "It's a noun! If you want an adjective you're going to have to go with 'wooden'!"
This observation broke the dam. A flood of grammatical pet peeves flowed forth. People use apostrophes to denote plurals instead of possession, double negatives, bad spelling, and "text" has become a verb!
We're losing our language, my family decided. I balked.
In a certain sense, this is correct. In another, more important sense, it's just plain wrong.
English teachers, or teachers of any language for that matter, may hate me for it, but I must point out that grammatical rules are not universal. They are not immutable. They are only normative to a very small extent: a much lesser extent than some people may want to give them credit for.
More about normativity later. For now, let's start with description.
Natural languages (commonly spoken ones) exist in flux. They change drastically over time and space. Yes, space. We speak the same English as the English?
And time is so much clearer. Languages evolve. Chaucer, Shakespeare, Thoreau, and I all wrote in English. Although you might properly say none of us writes in the same language.
And in that sense, my family is correct: we are losing our language. This version of English will pass away like all the others.
Over the past few decades, as the speed and ease of communication have increased, so has the rate of the language's evolution. And, as the language changes, so do it's rules. We shouldn't be surprised by this.
Now to the normative bit: maybe from what I've said, we have alienated the speakers of a language from it's rulebooks. As much as it may pain the high school Language Arts faculty, we should not insist on outmoded rules, and we should expect our current ones to change over time. Especially if they are exposed to be arbitrary, and not quite the criteria for distinguishing between "proper" and "improper" usage.
A few clarifications: first, it is not that the rules don't exist, or aren't rules. They are subjective to time and place, and so will change. Newer usages may irritate us, but if they become standard, that shouldn't bother us so much.
Second, the rules are not non-normative. They really do determine proper usage, but only within the spatio-temporal context of the speaker. And at that, the content is more important than the structure.
Third, and most important, the rules as they exist in usage, are noticed and then put into textbooks, not the other way around. That is, usage dictates rules (generally speaking).
So, I can proudly say now, that I am just going to go Google some wood fishes, and maybe text you about it later.
Friday, January 30, 2009
Inaugurating My Blog
I'm going to start out this blog by talking about the beloved Westboro Baptist Church people. Y'know the ones: "God Hates Fags", "Fags Doom Nations", "Thank God For Dead Soldiers" and the like.
Most recently, they made almost no noise at all by protesting the Obama Inauguration. They had flyers that said, predictably, "God Hates Obama."
So, that one doesn't make sense. On the one hand, they claim that God hates America and punished us with the World Trade Center attacks, etc., for our acceptance of homosexuality. On the other hand, God, they claim, hates Obama, but made him (presumably) the most powerful person on the planet.
Did His Omnipotence take a day off on election day? Or does he not care about political matters (which doesn't make sense in the first place, really, but let's entertain it for a moment), in which case, how could he hate a large political unit like, oh, let's say The United States of America?
One more point, a logical one, about these people. Over and over again in interviews, they claim they know they're on the right track with all of this hate speech because everyone hates them. The principle they appeal to? If you're doing the right thing, the world will hate you for it.
You're familiar, of course, with the conditional from classical logic? Sentences of the form: If it's a cat, then it's a mammal, or If A then B? If you have A, B follows. For example, if you have catness, mammalness follows, but it doesn't work the other way around. From mammalness, catness doesn't follow. If you have a mammal, it could be cat, but it could also be a dog, a whale, a bear, a human, etc. Which is structurally the direction they are applying their principle.
And, if the world hates you so much, why does it put you on so many talk shows? I think we secretly love these people. They're one of our favorite jokes.
Most recently, they made almost no noise at all by protesting the Obama Inauguration. They had flyers that said, predictably, "God Hates Obama."
So, that one doesn't make sense. On the one hand, they claim that God hates America and punished us with the World Trade Center attacks, etc., for our acceptance of homosexuality. On the other hand, God, they claim, hates Obama, but made him (presumably) the most powerful person on the planet.
Did His Omnipotence take a day off on election day? Or does he not care about political matters (which doesn't make sense in the first place, really, but let's entertain it for a moment), in which case, how could he hate a large political unit like, oh, let's say The United States of America?
One more point, a logical one, about these people. Over and over again in interviews, they claim they know they're on the right track with all of this hate speech because everyone hates them. The principle they appeal to? If you're doing the right thing, the world will hate you for it.
You're familiar, of course, with the conditional from classical logic? Sentences of the form: If it's a cat, then it's a mammal, or If A then B? If you have A, B follows. For example, if you have catness, mammalness follows, but it doesn't work the other way around. From mammalness, catness doesn't follow. If you have a mammal, it could be cat, but it could also be a dog, a whale, a bear, a human, etc. Which is structurally the direction they are applying their principle.
And, if the world hates you so much, why does it put you on so many talk shows? I think we secretly love these people. They're one of our favorite jokes.
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